Our analysis to date suggests that it could increase consumers ' electricity rates by as much as 50 % , which we believe is unacceptable .	ep
In addition , the combination of emission reductions and timing is not feasible and could threaten the reliability of electricity supply .	ep
We are concerned that S. 556 's short timeframes for installation of controls could lead power plants to be taken off-line at important times , which could lead to electricity shortages .	ep
We are concerned that S. 556 's short timeframes for installation of controls could lead power plants to be taken off-line at important times , which could lead to electricity shortages .	ep
A comprehensive legislative approach with mandatory caps could replace a good portion of the current regulatory requirements with a system that will reduce the administrative burden on industry and governments , use market-based approaches to lower compliance costs , reduce consumers ' costs , and increase national energy security by providing the industry with more certainty about its future regulatory obligations .	ep
These and other inefficiencies point to the need for a nationally coordinated approach that could reduce cost while improving environmental progress and accountability .	ep
Changing the Way We Do Business : Certainty , Flexibility , Accountability and Innovation We believe there is a better way , one that could cost American consumers and industry far less than under current law and ensure protection of the air we breathe in a far more certain , straightforward manner .	ep
A national cap and trade program with appropriate caps for NOx and SO 2 could provide the emission reductions necessary to bring a significant number of areas into attainment with the ozone and fine particle standards .	ep
Reliability problems could arise as large amounts of capacity are taken out of service for extended periods of time to install the control equipment necessary to meet the emissions reduction requirements .	ep
Requiring every plant over 30 years old to meet New Source Performance Standards and New Source Review modification requirements seems unnecessary and could undermine the benefits of the cap and trade approach .	ep
Our task was first to determine what happened and how it happened so that we could understand why it happened .	dy
Some on Wall Street and in Washington with a stake in the status quo may be tempted to wipe from memory the events of this crisis , or to suggest that no one could have foreseen or prevented them .	dy
This report endeavors to expose the facts , identify responsibility , unravel myths , and help us understand how the crisis could have been avoided .	ep
Despite the expressed view of many on Wall Street and in Washington that the crisis could not have been foreseen or avoided , there were warning signs .	dy
The prime example is the Federal Reserve ’ s pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages , which it could have done by setting prudent mortgage-lending standards .	dy
What else could one expect on a highway where there were neither speed limits nor neatly painted lines ?	dy
More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions , championed by former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others , supported by successive administrations and Congresses , and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn , had stripped away key safeguards , which could have helped avoid catastrophe .	ep
To give just three examples : the Securities and Exchange Commission could have required more capital and halted risky practices at the big investment banks .	dy
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and other regulators could have clamped down on Citigroup ’ s excesses in the run-up to the crisis .	dy
Policy makers and regulators could have stopped the runaway mortgage securitization train .	dy
And where regulators lacked authority , they could have sought it .	dy
Often , those systems encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be huge and the downside limited .	ep
Less than a 3 % drop in asset values could wipe out a firm .	dy
Nearly one in 10 mortgage borrowers in 2005 and 2006 took out “ option ARM ” loans , which meant they could choose to make payments so low that their mortgage balances rose every month .	dy
Massive , short-term borrowing , combined with obligations unseen by others in the market , heightened the chances the system could rapidly unravel .	ep
While there was some awareness of , or at least a debate about , the housing bubble , the record reflects that senior public officials did not recognize that a bursting of the bubble could threaten the entire financial system .	ep
Lenders made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive losses to investors in mortgage securities .	dy
Lenders made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive losses to investors in mortgage securities .	ep
As early as September 2004 , Countrywide executives recognized that many of the loans they were originating could result in “ catastrophic consequences . ”	ep
Less than a year later , they noted that certain high-risk loans they were making could result not only in foreclosures but also in “ financial and reputational catastrophe ”	ep
They all believed they could off-load their risks on a moment ’ s notice to the next person in line .	dy
AIG , which had not been required to put aside capital reserves as a cushion for the protection it was selling , was bailed out when it could not meet its obligations .	dy
The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval .	dy
This crisis could not have happened without the rating agencies .	ep
And you will see that without the active participation of the rating agencies , the market for mortgage- related securities could not have been what it became .	dy
The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done .	dy
The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done .	dy
Such a process could follow the following procedure .	ep
Upon such request , the President could also convene a face-to-face meeting with the authorized representatives of the recipient .	ep
